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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
l

STATE OF UTAHf

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
v.

:

DAVID E. BROWN,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 870504-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of Theft, a third
degree felony, after a jury trial in the Third Judicial District
Court.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah

Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the trial court properly admitted

defendant's prior misdemeanor theft convictions under Rule
609(a)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence.
2.

Whether the trial court properly found that a

juror's alleged failure to respond to a voir dire question did
not warrant a new trial?
3.

Whether the trial court properly found that a

juror's alleged remarks during a recess were not prejudicial presubmission deliberations warranting a new trial?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 609(a):
(a) For the purpose of attacking the
credibility of a witness, evidence that he

has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if elicited from his or established
by public record during cross-examination but
only if the crime (1) was punishable by death
or imprisonment in excess of one year under
the law under which he was convicted, and the
court determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2)
involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-18(e)(14) (1982):
(14) That a state of mind exists on the part
of the juror with reference to the cause, or
to either party, which will prevent him from
acting impartially and without prejudice to
the substantial rights of the party
challenging; but no person shall be
disqualified as a juror by reason of having
formed or expressed an opinion upon the
matter or cause to be submitted to such jury,
founded upon public rumor, statements in
public journals or commons notoriety, if it
satisfactorily appears to the court that the
juror can and will, notwithstanding such
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the
matter to be submitted to him.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-17(j) (1982):
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the
jurors are permitted to separate or are
sequestered, they shall be admonished by the
court that it is their duty not to converse
among themselves or to converse with, or
suffer themselves to be addressed by any
other person on any subject of the trial, and
that it is their duty not to form or express
an opinion thereon until the case is finally
submitted to them.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-24(a) (1982):
The court may, upon motion of a party or upon
its own initiative, grant a new trial in the
interest of justice if there is any error or
impropriety which had a substantial adverse
effect upon the rights of a party.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, David E. Brown, was charged with Theft, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann- § 76-6-404
(1978).

Defendant was found guilty after a jury trial held on

September 16, 1987, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Pat B. Brian,
Judge, presiding.

The Court sentenced defendant to serve a term

of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison and fined
defendant $5,000.00.

The Court suspended the fine and the prison

term and placed defendant on probation for eighteen months.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 28, 1987, defendant placed a case of cigarettes
in a shopping basket at a Farmer Jack's grocery store (R. 155, p.
55-57).

He casually pushed the basket up and down the aisles

until he eventually abandoned the basket and cigarettes and
walked out of the store (R. 155, p. 57-58).

Once outside,

defendant mounted his ten-speed bike and began riding around the
store parking lot while gazing through the store window (R. 155,
p. 58). The store manager, Dale Olson, observed defendant's odd
activities and informed Gary Young, the store's security officer,
of defendant's suspicious behavior (R. 155, p. 58).
Defendant re-entered the store, grabbed the case of
cigarettes, and began to walk out of the store (R. 155, p. 59).
Mr. Young stopped defendant as he stepped out of the store (R.
155, p. 70). The case held 30 cartons of cigarettes valued at
$323 (R. 155, p. 60). Shortly thereafter, Officer Jo Ellen
Waymant of the Salt Lake Police Department arrived at the store
and arrested defendant (R. 155, p. 86).

Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine to
exclude his prior misdemeanor theft convictions (R. 16-17).

The

trial court ruled that defendant's prior convictions were
admissible for the limited purpose of impeaching the defendant
(R. 155, p 15). As a result, defendant chose not to testify at
trial (R. 155, p. 15).
During the jury deliberations, the court received a
note from the jury which asked, "Does statements made by jurors
during recess that disturbed some members render our verdict
invalid?"

(R. 155, p. 92.)

The jury was called to the courtroom

where the judge admonished them to only consider the law and
evidence presented in the courtroom (R. 155, p. 93). Upon
further deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of guilty (R.
155, p. 96). The trial court polled the jury and asked each
juror individually whether they had considered anything other
than the evidence presented at the trial or the law given by the
court (R. 155, p. 96-97).

Each juror responded, "no."

Id.

Defendant filed a motion for a New Trial based on two
grounds (R. 130-31).

First, that during voir dire, Juror Hogan

failed to truthfully respond to general questioning about
previous retail employment (R. 138-39).

Second, that statements

made by Juror Hogan during a recess constituted pre-submission
bias against defendant's case (R. 138-39).
denied the motion (R. 152-53).

The trial court

Defendant now appeals.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly ruled that defendant's prior
misdemeanor theft convictions were admissible as impeachment

evidence under Rule 609(a)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence.

The Utah

Supreme Court has ruled that theft is a crime involving
-dishonesty" for purposes of impeaching the credibility of a
witness.
The United States Supreme Court has set forth a twoprong test to be applied in situations where a juror has
allegedly failed to disclose information on voir dire.

First, a

defendant must demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly
a material question on voir dire.

Second, he must show that a

correct response would have provided a valid basis for a
challenge for cause.

In the instant case, defendant failed to

prove the truth of the hearsay allegations that a juror failed to
disclose retail experience on voir dire.

Second, even if the

juror had responded that he had retail experience, that fact
alone was not justification for a challenge for cause.

The

United States Supreme Court has specifically rejected defendant's
claim that a juror's failure to properly respond on voir dire
prejudices a defendant's right of peremptory challenge.

Further,

it would be injudicious for this Court to adopt a presumptive
error rule under the State Constitution for alleged and unproven
juror non-disclosure on voir dire.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant's Motion for New Trial based upon its finding that the
alleged juror pre-submission statements were ambiguous and open
to multiple interpretation, that any error was cured by the
court's admonition and polling of the jury, and that any error
was harmless in light of the strong evidence of guilt.

Further,

under State constitutional analysis, the determination whether a
juror had pre-judged a defendant's guilt should be the
prerogative of the trial court, subject to review for abuse of
discretion.

Finally, the trial court's failure to admonish the

jury not to converse during recesses was harmless.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR THEFT CONVICTIONS WERE
ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 609(a)(2).
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in finding
that defendant's prior misdemeanor theft convictions were
admissible for impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(2), Utah
Rules of Evidence.

Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by

the admission of the impeachment evidence in that he was
effectively denied his right to testify on his own behalf.
Rule 609(a) allows evidence of other crimes to be
admitted for impeachment purposes under the following
circumstances:
Impeachment by evidence of conviction of
crime. (a)General rule: For the purpose of
attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him
or established by public record during crossexamination but only if the crime (1) was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year under the law which he was
convicted, and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or
false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
Utah Rules of Evidence 609(a).

The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33
(Utah 1984) unequivocally ruled that theft is a crime of
dishonesty for purposes of impeachment evidence.

Admittedly,

Cintron was based upon former Rule 21 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, but was decided after the adoption of the new Rules of
Evidence in 1983.

Cintron, 690 P.2d at 34. However, the Utah

Supreme Court's definition of crimes involving "dishonesty" as
including theft has not been overruled and is controlling.
In the instant case, the trial court ruled that
defendant's prior misdemeanor theft convictions were admissible
as impeachment evidence since they constituted crimes of
"dishonesty" as contemplated by Rule 609(a)(2) of the Utah Rules
of Evidence (R. 155, p. 15). The trial court further stated that
defendant's prior theft convictions directly reflect on the
question of defendant's credibility.

Id.

Therefore, the trial

court's ruling of admissibility was consistent with controlling
Utah case law and evidentiary rules.
In his brief, defendant relies on State v. Banner, 717
P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986) and State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah
1987) to argue that the defendant's misdemeanor theft convictions
should have been ruled inadmissible under 609(a).

Neither Banner

nor Gentry are applicable since they were decided under subparagraph (1) of Rule 609(a) which requires a balancing test for
the admission of general felony convictions.

In both Banner and

Gentry, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not
properly weigh the probative value of the impeachment evidence
against its prejudicial effect.

The court did not address the

issue of whether those convictions would have been admissible
under subsection (2) of Rule 609(a).
Other courts have ruled that theft type crimes are
admissible as crimes of "dishonesty" under Rule 609(a)(2),

In

United States v. Bianco, 419 F.Supp. 507 (E.D.Pa. 1976), aff'd.,
547 F.2d 1164 (3rd Cir. 1977), the district court judge ruled
that a prior conviction for breaking and entering, and armed
robbery were crimes of dishonesty.

The court thus admitted the

convictions for the limited purpose of impeachment.

See also,

United States v. Ackridqe, 370 F.Supp. 214, 218 (E.D.Pa. 1973)
aff'd., 500 F.2d 1400 (1974); United States v. Gray, 468 F.2d 257
(3rd Cir. 1972); United States v. Baber, 447 F.2d 1267, 1269,
(D.C. Cir. 1971), cert, denied 404 U.S. 957 (1971).
Defendant also relies on United States v. Smith, 551
F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976) for his assertion that theft is not a
crime involving dishonesty.

However, Smith involved an attempted

robbery conviction which was admitted by the trial court without
a consideration of Rule 609.

Id.

at 357.

The appellate court

found that attempted robbery is a crime of violence, not
dishonesty, and remanded the case back to the trial court for a
determination whether the probative value of admitting the
evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect.

Id.

Defendant further cites United States v. Millings, 535
F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1976) in which the Smith court ruled that
neither possession of a pistol without a license nor possession
of narcotics possess elements of dishonesty.

Because the

offenses in Millings are not theft related, Millings is
unsupportive of defendant's claim.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT A JUROR'S
ALLEGED FAILURE TO RESPOND ON VOIR DIRE DID
NOT WARRANT A NEW TRIAL.
A.

Defendant's Fair-Trial Rights Under The
United States Constitution Were Not
Violated By A Juror's Alleged Failure To
Respond To A Voir Dire Question.

Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in
refusing to grant him a new trial where a juror allegedly failed
to respond affirmatively to a question during voir dire.
Defendant argues that he was prejudiced because he was unable to
challenge the juror for cause, use a peremptory challenge, or
further question the juror.
The United States Supreme Court in McDonough Power
Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood et al., 464 U.S. 548 (1984) set
forth the test to be applied in situations where a juror has
allegedly failed to disclose information on voir dire.

The

McDonough test is as follows:
We hold that to obtain a new trial in such a
situation, a party must first demonstrate
that a juror failed to answer honestly a
material question on voir dire, and then
further show that a correct response would
have provided a valid basis for a challenge
for cause. . . .
464 U.S. at 556.

In the present case, defendant fails to meet

either prong of the two-prong test.
In ruling on defendant's Motion for New Trial, the
trial court found that the alleged statements of Juror Hogan
contained in the affidavits were ambiguous and did not reflect
bias or prejudice (R. 156, p. 30-31).

Further, defendant failed

to establish at the motion hearing that Juror Hogan actually

possessed retail experience and thus failed to respond
affirmatively to voir dire questioning.

Regarding hearsay

allegations of juror misconduct, the Colorado Court of Appeals
has held that:
a defendant must establish the truth of the
allegations on which he basis his motion for
new trial and must produce evidence of the
alleged jury misconduct. . . Failure to
establish the truth of hearsay allegations
contained in an affidavit will warrant denial
of a motion for new trial based on alleged
juror misconduct. . . .
People v. Rodgers, 706 P.2d 1288, 1291 (Colo. App. 1985)
(citations omitted).

Because defendant failed to prove the

hearsay allegations contained in the affidavits, the first prong
of the McDonough test was not established.
Defendant further fails to establish the second-prong
of the McDonough test which is that a correct response by the
juror would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for
cause.

During voir dire, six jurors responded that they had

worked in a retail store and were further asked whether their
experience would affect their impartiality if they were selected
as a juror.

Each answered that their retail experience would not

prevent them from being fair and impartial and, as a result, none
of them were questioned or challenged for cause by defendant (R.
155, p. 36-38).

Notably, defendant did not use a peremptory

challenge against any of the retail experienced jurors (R. 11415).
Clearly, under the facts of the present case, the
possession of retail experience by a juror was insufficient by
itself to establish grounds for a successful challenge for cause.

Therefore, under the McDonough test, defendant was not prejudiced
by Juror Hogan's alleged failure to disclose any retail
experience.
In support of his argument, defendant relies on People
v. Diaz, 152 Cal.App.3d 926, 200 Cal.Rptr. 77 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984) to assert that the McDonough test has been expanded.

In

Diaz, the California Court of Appeals for the Fourth District
held that a juror's failure to respond truthfully on voir dire
deprives a defendant of his right to challenge for cause or to
exercise a peremptory challenge.

Diaz, 152 Cal.App.3d at 932-33.

Defendant urges that Diaz extends the McDonough test to include
situations where a truthful juror response would be grounds for a
peremptory challenge.

However, the United States Supreme Court

in McDonough clearly rejected such a broad standard.

In

McDonough, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the
juror's failure to respond affirmatively on voir dire prejudiced
defendant's right of peremptory challenge.

Ld. at 551-52.

The

United States Supreme Court rejected the Tenth Circuit's ruling
and articulated the McDonough standard which requires a denial of
a challenge for cause.

Ld. at 556.

Other courts in California have rejected the ruling in
Diaz.

People v. Kelly, 185 Cal.App.3d 118, 229 Cal.Rptr. 584

(Cal. Ct. App. 1986); People v. Jackson, 168 Cal.App.3d 700, 214
Cal.Rptr. 346 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).

In Jackson, the California

Court of Appeals for the Second District agreed with the holding
in McDonough that:
M

. . . [a] trial represents an important
investment of private and social resources,

and it ill serves the important end of
finality to wipe the slate clean simply to
recreate the peremptory challenge process
because counsel lacked an item of information
which objectively he should have obtained
from a juror on voir dire examination." • . .
This court has long held that '"[a litigant]
is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect
one/' for there are no perfect trials.' . . .
People v. Jackson, 214 Cal.Rptr. at 349, quoting McDonough, 464
U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).

Likewise, the Kelly court

agreed with the dissent in Diaz that the right to exercise a
peremptory challenge does not support a presumption of prejudice.
People v. Kelly, 229 Cal.Rptr. at 584.
Defendant also relies on United States v. Bynum, 634
F.2d 768 (4th Cir. 1980) and People v. Borrelli, 624 P.2d 900
(Colo. Ct. App. 1980) which were decided prior to McDonough.
Unlike the present case, both Bynum and Borrelli involved
intentional concealment of bias by a juror.

In the present case,

there was no evidence presented in the lower court that Juror
Hogan intentionally concealed information nor that prejudice
resulted.

In fact, the trial record establishes that Juror Hogan

was not prejudiced against defendant as evidenced by his response
during the polling of the jury:
THE COURT: Mr. David Hogan, was your verdict
in this case influenced by anything other
than the evidence presented in this courtroom
and the law given you by the Court?
JUROR NO. 8:

No, sir.

(R. 155, p. 97). Juror Hogan's answer assured the court that he
had only considered the evidence at trial and the law given by
the court and that he found defendant guilty based only on the
law and the evidence.

B.

Defendant's Fair-Trial Rights Under The
Utah Constitution Were Not Violated By A
Juror's Alleged Failure To Respond To A
Voir Dire Question.

While admitting that there is no Utah case law
precedent on the issue, defendant argues that the Utah
constitution requires a more stringent test than the federal
constitution when jury misconduct is involved.

In support of his

argument, defendant relies on State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah
1985) and State v. Erickson, 749 P.2d 620 (Utah 1987) in which
the court's holdings were limited to situations involving juror
contact with witnesses, attorneys, or court personnel.

Id.

Defendant analogizes that as in Pike and Erickson, this Court
should hold that a juror's alleged and unproven failure to
respond to a voir dire question should be presumed error.
Defendant's argument should be rejected.
The United States Supreme Court in McDonough expressed
its opinion in this regard when it said " [w]e have come a long
way from the time when all trial error was presumed prejudicial
and reviewing courts were considered "'citadels of
technicality.'""

McDonough, 464 U.S. at 553, quoting Kotteakos

v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946) quoting Kanaugh,
Improvement of Administration of Criminal Justice by Exercise of
Judicial Power, 11 A.B.A.J. 217, 222 (1925).

"To invalidate the

result of a 3-week trial because of a juror's mistaken, though
honest, response to a question, is to insist on something closer
to perfection than our judicial system can be expected to give."
464 U.S. at 555.

As the California court noted in People v. Jackson,
supra;
It is with good reason that the law places
severe limitations on the ability to impeach
a jury's verdict. To hold otherwise would be
to declare "open season" on jury verdicts not
to a party's liking. A green light would be
given for every unsuccessful litigant to root
out after-the-fact evidence of any
"subconscious bias." . . .
People v. Jackson, 214 Cal.Rptr. at 348.
For the same reasons, it would be injudicious for this
court to adopt a presumptive error rule for alleged and unproven
juror non-disclosure on voir dire.

To allow such would permit an

unsuccessful criminal defendant to presumptively invalidate an
otherwise valid verdict by merely alleging, but not proving,
juror bias.

Thus, the burden in attacking a verdict would no

longer be placed on the party seeking to upset the judgment, but
rather, the burden would be placed on the party seeking to
maintain it.

As a result, the harmless error rule which requires

a showing of prejudice in order to justify a reversal would be
vitiated.

Therefore, respondent strongly urges this Court to

interpret Utah constitutional law consistent with the Supreme
Court's ruling in McDonough.
Defendant further relies on Rule 18 of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure which sets forth the grounds upon which a
juror may be challenged for cause.
18(e)(14) (1982).

Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-

Defendant then speculates that had juror Hogan

responded affirmatively to the voir dire question, "he very well
may have fit within this subsection allowing for dismissal" (Br.
of App. at p. 16). As argued above, mere speculation of juror

bias should not be grounds upon which to presume prejudice.

In

the absence of a showing of undisclosed juror bias which would,
if disclosed, have been grounds to challenge for cause, the trial
court's denial of defendant's Motion for New Trial was proper.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN RULING THAT A JUROR'S ALLEGED COMMENTS
DURING A RECESS DID NOT WARRANT A NEW TRIAL.
A. Defendant's Fair-Trial Rights Under The
United States Constitution Were Not Violated
By A Juror's Alleged Comments During A
Recess.
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying
his Motion for New Trial which alleged that Juror Hogan made
prejudicial statements during a recess which constituted presubmission deliberations.

He concludes that any pre-submission

jury deliberations violates a defendant's constitutional
guarantee to an impartial jury.
A motion for new trial is governed by Rule 24(a) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:
The court may, upon motion of a party or upon
its own initiative, grant a new trial in the
interest of justice if there is any error or
impropriety which had a substantial adverse
effect upon the rights of a party.
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-24(a) (1982).
The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that Mthe
decision to grant or deny a new trial is a matter of discretion
with the trial court and will not be reversed absent a clear
abuse of that discretion.

State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222

(Utah 1985); State v. Bundy, 589 P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 1978), cert.

denied, 441 U.S. 926 (1979); State v. Swain, 541 P.2d 5, 6 (Utah 1975).
The Court further explained that a trial court will not be considered
to have abused its discretion unless it is shown that there is a grave
suspicion of a miscarriage of justice.
(Utah 1973).

State v. Harris, 513 P.2d 438

In other words, M[i]f there be evidence before the court

upon which reasonable men might differ as to whether or not the
defendant is guilty, the trial court may deny a motion for a new
trial. " J[d. at 440.
In the present case, a woman juror allegedly commented
during a pre-deliberation recess that "the defense attorney did
not appear worried" (R. 138). In response, Juror Hogan stated,
"Well, that guy doesn't matter."
defendant as "that black man."

1(1.

He further referred to

Id.

During jury deliberations, the jury caused a note to be
sent to the trial court (R. 155, p. 92). The jury returned to
the courtroom and the following dialogue took place:
THE COURT: The Court has received a note
from the jury as follows: "Does statements
made by jurors during recess that disturbed
some members render our verdict invalid?"
The question sent out of the jury room has
been shown to both counsel. The Court asked
each individual juror during the jury
selection process if you would listen to the
law that was given to you by the Court, apply
that law to the facts that were produced in
court, evidence produced in court, and render
a decision based on the law given and the
facts and evidence presented in court. Each
juror indicated, equivocally, they would.
Your responsibility in this case is to
disregard anything that you think has been
said that may have some bearing on the
outcome of the case. Disregard any
conjecture or speculation that could possibly
have come into consideration in the jury
room. You decide the case solely on the law
given to you by the Court and on the evidence

that was produced in the courtroom.
further?
JUROR NO. 6:
everyone?

Anything

Is that satisfactory to

(Affirmative response.)
JUROR NO. 6:
THE COURT:

Thank you.

You are welcome.

(R. 155, pp. 92-93).
The jury resumed deliberations and subsequently
returned a verdict of guilty (R. 155, p. 96). The trial judge
then polled each member of the jury whether their verdict was
influenced by anything other than the evidence presented in the
courtroom and the law given by the court (R. 155, pp. 96-97).
Each member of the jury, including Juror Hogan, responded that
they were not influenced by anything other than the law and the
evidence.

Id.
At the hearing on defendant's Motion for New Trial,

defendant introduced an affidavit of Juror Alan Blain which
alleged that Juror Hogan's statements were such that he appeared
to have pre-determined defendant's guilt (R. 138-39).
Defendant's trial counsel also submitted her affidavit setting
forth her conversations with the jury members (R. 132-33).
Pursuant to Rule 606(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the trial
court, on the State's motion, struck all statements and
affidavits which inquired into the validity of the jury's verdict
without a claim of extraneous influence (R. 22).
In ruling on defendant's motion, the trial court found
as follows:

THE COURT; The Court makes the following
findings. The statements made by the juror,
Mr. Hogan, all three statements are ambiguous
and subject to multiple interpretation. None
of the statements reflect a direct expression
of bias or prejudice against the defendant or
a predetermination of the defendant's
innocence or guilt by the juror making the
statement.
Secondly, the Court finds that
the statements made by the juror were perhaps
inappropriate and perhaps were of some degree
of error, but, in the totality of the case,
the statements were harmless.
The Court further finds that once the
concern by the jurors, after deliberations
had commenced, that there was some concern
about events that had occurred out of the
jury room, the court assembled the jury. The
jurors were questioned. The jurors were
instructed that they were to follow the law,
as set forth by the Court in its
instructions, to apply the law to the facts
that were presented in court, and that a
proper and thorough admonition was given to
the jurors prior to the time that a guilty
verdict was returned against the defendant,
and that any error that may have occurred
prior to that time was corrected by the
Court's inquiry and admonition.
The Court further finds that the outcome
of this case would not have been any
different whether the juror had made the
prior expressions or not. The case, in the
Court's opinion, was a very strong case for
the State, regarding the defendant's guilt,
and that any error that occurred was harmless
error in the total scheme of the case.
The Court, therefore, denies the motion
for a new trial on those specific findings.
(R. 155, pp. 30-31) .
Thus, the trial court denied defendant's motion for
three reasons:

(1) that Juror Hogan's statements were ambiguous,

open to multiple interpretations, and did not reflect bias or a
pre-determination of guilt; (2) that any error was cured by the

trial court's admonition to the jury and polling of the jury's
verdict, and; (3) that any error was harmless in light of the
strong evidence of defendant's guilt.

The trial court's findings

being soundly based and clearly set forth, no abuse of discretion
exists.
In a similar case, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a
trial court's denial of a Motion for New Trial.

In State v.

Moon, 688 P.2d 4 94 (Utah 1984), a bystander overheard one juror
say to another, "Well, we only have to hear one more confession
and then we are through."

Icl. at 495.

The Court found that the

juror's statement "can be construed in a number of ways that do
not necessarily support defendant's conclusion that the juror had
prejudged defendant's guilt before all the evidence was
presented."

^d.

Under such circumstances, the Court stated that

it is the prerogative of the trial court to determine whether a
hearsay statement, subject to multiple interpretations, is
prejudicial, and, if so, if it is to the point of reversibility.
1^. at 495-96.
Likewise, in the instant case, great deference should
be afforded the trial court's finding that the hearsay statements
were ambiguous, subject to multiple interpretations and did not
constitute reversible prejudice.

Accordingly, this Court should

affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's new trial motion.
B.

Defendant's Fair-Trial Rights Under The Utah
Constitution Were Not Violated By A Juror's Alleged
Comments During A Recess.

Defendant argues that on questions of juror
impartiality, Utah constitutional protections surpass federal

protections.

He urges this Court to adopt a standard of presumed

prejudice in circumstances where pre-submission deliberations
are suspected.

In support of his argument, defendant again

relies on State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985) in which the
Utah Supreme Court found that juror contact with witnesses,
attorneys, or court personnel is presumed prejudicial.
As discussed in Point II above, it would be ill-advised
for this Court to adopt a presumptive error rule for alleged and
unproven pre-submission jury deliberations.

In fact, the Utah

Supreme Court in State v. Moon, 688 P.2d 494 (Utah 1984), under
similar circumstances, found that it is the trial court's
prerogative to determine whether a juror had pre-judged a
defendant's guilt before all the evidence was presented.
495.

Ld. at

In light of the trial court's finding in the present case,

as in Moon, that the evidence did not support defendant's claim
of pre-submission deliberations, this Court should defer to the
trial court's advantaged position.
Defendant further claims that Rule 17(j) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure extends his State constitutional
protections in circumstances where pre-submission deliberations
are suspected.

Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-17(j) (1982).

Rule 17

reads as follows:
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the
jurors are permitted to separate or are
sequestered, they shall be admonished by the
court that it is their duty not to converse
among themselves or to converse with, or
suffer themselves to be addressed by any
other person on any subject of the trial, and
that it is their duty not to form or express
an opinion thereon until the case is finally
submitted to them.

Id,

Defendant claims that because the trial court failed to

admonish the jurors during a brief recess and at lunch,
prejudicial error must be presumed.

Defendant's claim is wholly

without merit.
First, defendant failed to contemporaneously raise the
issue in the trial court below and is thus precluded from raising
the issue for the first time on appeal.

See State v. McCardell,

652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982) (applying contemporaneous objection rule
Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1)).

Second, the recess and lunch break

were respectively prior to the taking of evidence and after the
evidence had been presented (R. 155, pp. 54, 87). Third,

the

juror statements alleged to be deliberative were ambiguous and
insufficient to support defendant's claim of prejudice (R. 138;
R. 155, pp. 30-31).
Finally, the trial court's failure to admonish the jury
at the recess and lunch break should be considered harmless error
in the absence of a showing of prejudice.

See Utah Code Ann.

S 77-35-30(a) (1982); Utah R. Evid. 103; State v. Tucker, 709
P.2d 313 (Utah 1985) (the court will not reverse a conviction
unless the error is something substantial and prejudicial in the
sense that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence
there would have been a different result).

In the present case,

the trial court admonished the jury to consider only the law and
evidence given in the courtroom (R. 155, p. 92-93).

When polled,

each member of the jury acknowledged that they had considered
only the law and evidence (R. 155, pp. 96-97).

The jury's

conscientious behavior in notifying the court of disturbing juror

statements indicates that the jury wanted to assure the integrity
and objectivity of their verdict•

Lastly, the trial court found

that on a scale of 1 to 10, 10 being the strongest case
establishing guilt, defendant's trial rated a 10 (R. 156, pp. 1718).

In light of the above circumstances, there is no reasonable

likelihood that defendant would have been acquitted had the trial
court admonished the jurors not to converse among themselves
during any recess.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, respondent
respectfully requests this Court to affirm defendant's conviction
and sentence.
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